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Notre Europe
Notre Europe is an independent think tank devoted to European integration. Under 
the guidance of Jacques Delors, who created Notre Europe in 1996, the association 
aims to “think a united Europe”.
Our ambition is to contribute to the current public debate by producing analyses 
and pertinent policy proposals that strive for a closer union of the peoples of 
Europe. We are equally devoted to promoting the active engagement of citizens 
and civil society in the process of community construction and the creation of a 
European public space.
In this vein, the staff of Notre Europe directs research projects; produces and 
disseminates analyses in the form of short notes, studies, and articles; and organises 
public debates and seminars. Its analyses and proposals are concentrated around 
four themes:
• Visions of Europe: The community method, the enlargement and deepening of 
the EU and the European project as a whole are a work in constant progress. Notre 
Europe provides in-depth analysis and proposals that help find a path through the 
multitude of Europe’s possible futures.
• European Democracy in Action: Democracy is an everyday priority. Notre Europe 
believes that European integration is a matter for every citizen, actor of civil society 
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and level of authority within the Union. Notre Europe therefore seeks to identify and 
promote ways of further democratising European governance.
• Competition, Cooperation, Solidarity: “Competition that stimulates, coopera-
tion that strengthens, and solidarity that unites”. This, in essence, is the European 
contract as defined by Jacques Delors. True to this approach, Notre Europe explores 
and promotes innovative solutions in the fields of economic, social and sustainable 
development policy.
• Europe and World Governance: As an original model of governance in an increas-
ingly open world, the European Union has a role to play on the international scene 
and in matters of world governance. Notre Europe seeks to help define this role.
 
Notre Europe aims for complete freedom of thought and works in the spirit of the 
public good. It is for this reason that all of Notre Europe’s publications are available 
for free from our website, in both French and English: www.notre-europe.eu. Its 
Presidents have been successively, Jacques Delors (1996-2004), Pascal Lamy 
(2004-2005), Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2005-2010) and António Vitorino (since 
2011).
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Summary
This study probes the way in which the use of the qualified majority voting has 
developed in the Council of the European Union. The investigation begins with the 
Single European Act, which expanded the field of decision making by qualified 
majority in an effort to facilitate the adoption of the directives concerning the 
Single Market. Quantitative data and interviews with members of the Council point 
to unexpected continuity.
• The number of legislative acts adopted despite negative votes and absten-
tions was low throughout the period investigated (on average, less than a 
quarter of the documents requiring a qualified majority).
• Yet the search for a qualified majority rather than for universal agreement 
is the driving force behind negotiations. The negotiators’ main goal is to 
determine whether or not there is a blocking minority against any given 
decision. The existence or the absence of such a minority determines 
the moment when the presidency of the Council proposes a document’s 
adoption. Today as in the past, concern over effectiveness explains why 
the presidency resorts to the use of a qualified majority as a weapon 
of dissuasion towards negotiators who fear ending up in a minority. 
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• Despite this, the minutes of these Council meetings point to a low oppo-
sition and abstention rate, because ministers who fail to gain satisfaction 
tend to rally to the majority once they know that a measure is going to be 
adopted.
• The publication of votes, which began in 1993, has not put paid to this 
strategy. Most decisions are taken by the preparatory committees that 
prepare Council meetings (Coreper and Special Committee on Agriculture), 
but the measures have to be officially adopted by the Council of Ministers, 
which gives the member states the opportunity to rally to the majority 
between the time a measure is unofficially agreed on and the moment it is 
officially adopted.
• However, ministers of member states in which there is stringent parliamen-
tary oversight cannot avail themselves of that opportunity. Thus it is going 
to be necessary to assess the extent to which the increase in national par-
liaments’ role laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon has a practical impact on 
voting in the Council.
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Aim of the study
This study aims to show how the use of qualified majority voting has evolved in 
the Council of the European Union from midway through the 1980s until today. 
We would like to state from the outset that it is not about looking into the gradual 
substitution of qualified majority voting for unanimity in different fields, nor into 
consecutive reforms of the voting procedure as these have been widely studied. 
Qualified majority voting is based on a weighting of the votes of member states 
awarded mostly according to their populations. A key feature of it is its fairly high 
qualified majority threshold (about 70% of the votes). Successive enlargements of 
the European Union have meant that the weighting needed to be redefined, which 
gave rise to tense negotiations between the governments of member states. The 
most famous of these is no doubt the one that took place during the intergovern-
mental conference in Nice in 2000. However, sometimes people argue that these 
stormy debates are unwarranted because, generally speaking, the Council does 
not vote and decides ‘by consensus’. On average, since 1993, the year when the 
results of votes began to be published, about 80% of legislative acts coming under 
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the qualified majority voting procedure have been adopted unopposed.1 Does that 
mean that when an act is adopted unopposed, that happens following a search for 
consensus during which qualified majority voting has been left to one side? What 
role does this rule play when decisions seem to be taken unopposed? Has the role 
of qualified majority voting evolved since the Single Act (1986), which extended 
the area governed by qualified majority to facilitate the adoption of directives 
making up the Single Market?
1.  Cf. Mattila, M. and Lane, J.-E., ‘Why Unanimity in the Council? A Roll Call Analysis of Council Voting’, European Union 
Politics, 2001, 2/1, p. 31 – 52; Hayes-Renshaw, F. et Wallace, H., ‘When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes 
Explicitly’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006, 44/1, p. 161-94; Dehousse R., Deloche-Gaudez F. et Duhamel 
O., Élargissement : comment l’Europe s’adapte [Enlargement: How Europe adapts], Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 
2006; Hagemann S. et De Clerck-Sachsse J., ‘Old rules, new game: decision-making in the Council of Ministers after 
the 2004 Enlargement’, Special CEPS Report, Center for European Policy Studies, Bruxelles, 2007-03.
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Method, sources and limitations
While the Council has a reputation for being a non-transparent institution, this 
research also had to find the means to get around a sizeable obstacle, which is that 
the publication of votes only became compulsory in December 1993. In addition, 
the votes published as from 1993 only cover adopted legislative acts. We do not 
have data on the acts that were not adopted by the Council. It is very rare for a text 
to be rejected by a vote because, when the presidency of the Council considers, 
following its bilateral contacts with the representatives of member states, that the 
number of votes needed to adopt a text has not been reached, it does not ask del-
egations to vote. It sends the text back to the Committee of permanent represen-
tative2 or to the working group, which will try to grant additional concessions to 
opponents to get rid of the blocking minority.
This study is based firstly on about sixty or so interviews with Council personnel 
carried out between 2006 and 2010. We would like to thank the persons who 
agreed to be interviewed. We asked them for general descriptions of their practices 
in plenary session (the ways decisions were reached, the role of qualified majority 
2.  Or to the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) if the text pertains to this field.
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voting during negotiations, opposition strategies, etc.) and we tried to obtain infor-
mation on the impact that some objective changes might have had:
1. The publication of votes as from 1993;
2. The extension of codecision with the European Parliament;
3.  The growing number of members of the Council due to successive 
enlargements.
One could, for example, presume that this increase has made votes more frequent 
and that the famous substitution of the vote with consensus was a feature of the 
Council’s business when there were fewer member countries.
We have tried to cover the different stages of decision-making, i.e. the working 
groups, the Committee of permanent representative 1 (Coreper 1)3, the Special 
Committee on Agriculture (SCA) and the Council. We have made sure that we have 
interviewed people who carry out the different possible roles: presidency of the 
Council, national representative, member of the General Secretariat. We also inter-
viewed two representatives of the Commission in Coreper 1 and in the Council. 
For interviews with country representatives, we tried to diversify and balance out 
the sample by consulting categories according to which one customarily considers 
member states: size, how long they have been EU members, geographic location.
This research is also based on a consultation of minutes before and after 1993. We 
compared the number of legislative acts that had qualified majority as a legal basis 
that were adopted in spite of negative votes and/or abstentions during the last 
year of the Delors I Commission in 1988, and during the last year of the Barroso I 
Commission in 2008.4
We were obliged to set out certain limitations to this study.
First of all, we took into account the fact that voting practice can vary from one 
sector to another (the Agriculture and Fisheries Council has, for example, a repu-
3.  Until the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Coreper 1 was in charge of most dossiers that had to be decided 
by qualified majority, while the Coreper 2 dealt mostly with dossiers to be decided by unanimity.
4.  For 2008, the data were provided by the Observatoire des institutions européennes [Observatory of European 
Institutions], IEP, in Paris. Our thanks to Florence Deloche-Gaudez. For 1988, they are the result of our own research 
in the Council’s archives.
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tation for voting more often than other Councils) but we did not study the possible 
sector-by-sector variations in a systematic way.5 Several interviews were done with 
officials from Coreper 1, which deals with a big share of the files coming under 
qualified majority. Although the issue of sector-by-sector variations was raised 
during the interviews with these people who have a crosscutting vision, it merits a 
much more detailed study. As the scope of qualified majority has expanded over 
the years, it would be necessary to select sectors in which qualified majority voting 
has been in place for quite a long time for a sector-by-sector comparison to be 
relevant.
Also, voting habits differ from member state to member state. Some systematical-
ly avoid being outvoted. They accept a compromise early and are not outvoted for 
that reason (that is the case for France for example). Others have a reputation for 
having fewer complexes about being outvoted – this is the case for Germany.6 We 
take this factor into account in this study in general but we could also do a more 
detailed study on the evolution of these habits.
Finally, this study does not include the particular case of qualified majority voting in 
comitology, in particular on the issue of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).7
5.  For a sector-by-sector comparison, see Dehousse R. et al., Que fait l’Europe? [What is Europe doing?], Presses de 
Sciences Po, 2009, p. 86 sq.
6.  We can identify three main reasons: 1. when the German representatives are put in a minority, they can thus go 
beyond the position of the Länder; 2. the Single Market represents an advantage for the Germans in any case;  
3. German interests in some commercial and antidumping policies are in conflict with the Commission’s positions.
7.  Cf. Pollack, Mark A. and Shaffer, Gregory C., ‘Risk regulation, GMOs and the limits of deliberation’, in Naurin, D. and 
Wallace, Helen, Unveiling the Council, Basingstoke, U.K., Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, p. 144-164.
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I. Low level of negative votes and abstentions in 1988 and 2008
To shed light on the trends in voting practices, first of all we tried to determine how 
frequently member states recorded negative votes and abstentions8 in the 1980s. 
We chose to compare the number of legislative acts adopted despite negative 
votes and abstentions in 1988 and 2008. The scope of this comparison is limited 
by the fact that there has been an increase in the number of areas coming under 
qualified majority voting. In 1988, this was mainly agriculture, fisheries and the 
Single Market.
In 1988, around 320 legislative acts with qualified majority voting as their legal 
basis were formally adopted by the Council.9 Negative votes or abstentions only 
appear for 34 legislative acts coming under qualified majority voting, i.e. a bit more 
than 10% of acts adopted that could have legally been adopted despite opposi-
tion. We can add to these 34 votes a dozen or so cases in which the minutes note 
that an act was decided on ‘by qualified majority’. This form of words means that 
there were opponents who did not want to appear in the minutes. We will come 
8.  When the rule is a qualified majority vote, abstention counts as a negative vote.
9.  We counted directives, regulations and decisions. We only took into account formally adopted acts and not Council 
common positions for which the European Parliament’s opinion is needed before formal adoption.
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back to this practice. For now, we will note that, if one takes into account these few 
cases, the proportion of texts adopted despite opponents rises to about 14%. In 
2008, 30 legislative acts out of 200 acts coming under qualified majority voting 
were adopted despite negative votes and abstentions, which amounts to 15% of 
acts adopted despite opposition. There are therefore not many cases of resorting 
to a negative vote or abstention for the two years that we have looked into.
However, this comparison is limited because the officials involved in the decisions 
taken before 1993 state that the votes were not recorded with the greatest of rigour 
on the minutes. We will also come back to this point.
As we indicated, if you compare the distribution of negative votes and abstentions 
by sector in 1988 and 2008, we come up against the fact that the area coming 
under qualified majority voting has expanded. However, the table below offers a 
sector-by-sector comparison:
Sector-by-Sector compariSon - 1988 and 2008
year
Sector
1988 2008
agriculture 10 7
FiSherieS 12 2
Single market  
and induStrial policy
6 7
environment 1 2
number oF actS voted on  
in the above SectorS / total number oF voteS
29/34 10 18/30 11
This table shows that, partly because of this extension, 12 of the acts contested in 
2008 do not come from sectors where opposition was expressed in 1988. However, 
more than half of the acts contested in 2008 belong to the same sectors as most 
of the acts contested in 1988, namely agriculture, fisheries, the Single Market and 
environment.
10.  The five acts not detailed in this table are commercial agreements with non-EU countries, a budgetary decision and 
a decision concerning the cooperation programme between the universities and companies in terms of training in 
the area of COMETT II technologies.
11.  The 12 acts not detailed cover transport, the customs union, free movement of people, work, information, the 
statute of European civil servants and the budget.
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This distribution appears to confirm the reputation that the Agriculture/Fisheries 
Council has for voting more often than other Councils. However, the proportion 
of public votes is not distributed in the same way between the fisheries and agri-
culture sectors for the two periods. According to data from the Observatory of the 
European institutions, for the agriculture sector for the period from January 2002 
until June 2007, 37% of the acts coming under qualified majority voting ended up 
with a public vote. This proportion is lower than 15% for the fisheries sector12. 
For 1988, in the agriculture sector, ten acts out of 140 were adopted despite the 
explicit opposition – and in two cases the abstention – of member states, which 
amounts to 7% of contested acts. In addition, while, in 1988, 12 acts out of 47 
were contested in the fisheries sector (i.e. about 25% of contested acts), in 2008 
only two acts were contested in this sector.
One should note that the high number of contested acts in 1988 can be partly 
explained because Spain was then the main country contesting Council decisions 
in the area of fisheries. Soon after it had joined the EU, Spain would often vote 
against proposals that it did not consider in line with its interests before it gradually 
yielded to the ‘culture of consensus’. Ireland and Denmark also opposed several 
regulations in the same sector in 1988.
This leads us to look at the distribution of negative votes and abstentions by 
member state. Comparing the distribution by country has limited relevance due to 
the enlargements. The table below only takes into account the countries that were 
already EU members in 1988. The countries are ranked based on the number of 
decisions that they opposed in 1988, in descending order.
12.  See Que fait l’Europe ? [What is Europe doing], p. 98-99.
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diStribution by member State (in %)
year
member State
1988 2008
Spain 3.75 1
denmark 3.1 2
greece 2.5 1.5
ireland 1.9 1.5
united kingdom 1.9 3.5
italy 1.6 1
France 1.25 0.5
portugal 0.9 1
germany 0.9 2
netherlandS 0.6 1
belgium 0 2
luxembourg 0 1.5
The number of negative votes and abstentions by member state is on average higher 
in 1988 than in 2008. In 1988, the 34 votes were spread between ten countries 
(out of 12). In 2008, the 30 were spread between 23 countries (out of 27).13 In 
1988, the maximum number of negative votes or abstentions for a country was 12 
(for Spain) whereas it was only seven in 2008 (for Great Britain, the countries not 
taken into account for 2008 having all voted less than six times).
If we look at the countries individually, we note that Germany, which today has a 
reputation for not hesitating from ending up in a minority, was in 1988 among the 
countries that voted the least often against the measures adopted or abstained. 
Greece, which opposed decisions in various sectors in 1988 only opposed three 
decisions in 2008. By contrast, Denmark was, in 1988, already among the countries 
that contested the measures adopted the most often.
In general, this comparison shows that the Council was already tending to adopt 
legislative acts without explicit opposition in 1988 although apparently some 
member states abstained or voted more easily against the adopted acts. However, 
given the different limits of this comparison, it is important to complement it by 
hearing from officials in the Council.
13.  The fact that over 300 acts coming under qualified majority voting were adopted in 1988, against 200 in 2008,  
is another limit to the scope of this comparison.
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II.  From an automatic to a sophisticated use of qualified 
majority voting14
The interviews show that qualified majority voting has been used fairly consis-
tently since the Single Act. It acts like a deterrent, as one official put it, used by the 
presidency of the EU vis-à-vis member states, who avoid opening up voting proce-
dures as far as possible, be that by raising their hands or via a ‘tour de table’. The 
delegations know that they can end up in a minority and try to be constructive so as 
not to be marginalised. That is why most decisions seem to be taken unopposed. 
According to a permanent representative, out of the 260 directives that the Single 
Market has put in place, only about forty have led to a vote.15 However, while it has 
been possible to adopt all these directives efficiently, that is due to the option of 
having a vote. Since the Single Act, the Council has worked and generally continues 
to work as follows. When a proposal reaches the working group and then Coreper 
or Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA), the players – the presidency, the sec-
retariat, the Commission, national representatives – try to determine if there is a 
blocking minority. That is why, during plenary sessions and bilateral meetings, 
qualified majority calculations go on all the time. However, it is done implicitly. 
It is not based on an open vote of delegations during the session but is deduced 
14.  These terms are those of a Permanent Representative to the Council during the period studied.
15.  De Schoutheete Philippe, Une Europe pour tous [A Europe for everyone], Paris, Odile Jacob, 1997, p. 20.
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by people listening to the positions expressed in plenary session or unofficially 
as delegations do not explicitly refer to a vote. When the presidency thinks that 
there is no longer a solid blocking minority against a proposal or a presidency com-
promise solution, it declares that it can be adopted by encouraging those in the 
minority to join the majority through cosmetic concessions. The proposal tends to 
be adopted unopposed because those in the minority do not see any interest in 
voting against an adopted text (we will come back to their reasons for that).
As one participant in the Transport Council put it: “If an observer were to attend 
Council meetings he or she would notice next to no evidence of qualified-majority 
voting. It is very unusual for presidencies to ask delegations to vote. The official 
explanation is that presidencies will seek consensus around the table and will 
thus avoid isolating colleagues. This expression of noblesse oblige is, of course, 
very welcome but is only part of the explanation. Qualified-majority voting is like 
the sword of Damocles hanging above the negotiation table. It is in the mind of 
everyone. The Presidency, Commission, and delegations assess the state of nego-
tiation – almost permanently and automatically – in terms of whether there is a 
qualified majority or a blocking minority. […] A lack of official voting […] does not 
mean at all that the qualified-majority system is absent, nor does it mean that 
finding consensus is the general rule.”16
While this mechanism is constantly at play, some of those interviewed said that the 
qualified majority voting engine has not always worked with the same power or, 
to put it another way, the threat of being in the minority has not always been used 
with the same vigour by different presidencies. We will try to highlight some of the 
major phases although it is difficult to determine with precision if the influence of 
qualified majority voting has varied as it is used implicitly so often.
16.  Bal, Leendert Jan, ‘Member states operating in the EU Council of ministers: inside impressions’, in Meerts, Paul W. 
et Cede, Franz (ed.), Negotiating European Union, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, N.Y.: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004.
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However, it seems that we can isolate a first phase from the time of the Single 
Act to 1992.17 The remarks from members of the Council at that time converge. 
The need to build the Single Market led to full use being made of the potential of 
qualified majority voting, with the presidency playing on ministers’ fear of being 
outvoted to push for the adoption of directives. The vote was used in an abrupt 
way in the early years, without any real diplomatic niceties, like a ‘procedural guil-
lotine’, to use the words of one representative. It seems that the highest number of 
formal votes took place in 1986 (80 or 90 votes according to sources18) before this 
number gradually declined. While remaining the engine behind decision-making, 
qualified majority voting began to work in a more implicit way. The bad relations 
that explicitly putting people in a minority created and the danger of a representa-
tive or minister brutally isolated by the presidency taking revenge in subsequent 
negotiations encouraged people to make the use of qualified majority voting more 
‘sophisticated’. For example, the presidency avoided referring to the majority or 
the minority in plenary session and sought to grant concessions to those in the 
minority so that they would join the majority without losing face. That is why we 
sometimes think that the Council has replaced the qualified majority voting rule 
with the practice of achieving a consensus. The hypothesis according to which 
qualified majority voting has gradually become more widespread, whereas the 
small number of officials made it possible to seek general agreements initially is 
therefore not backed up by what interviewees said. In fact, the contrary is the case.
17.  For data on votes before 1993, cf. J.-L. Dewost, “Le vote majoritaire : simple modalité de gestion ou enjeu politique 
essential ?” [The majority vote: simple management tool or essential political tool] in Du droit international au droit 
de l’intégration, Liber amicorum Pierre Pescatore, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, p. 167-175;  
Ponzano, Paolo, “Le processus de décision dans l’Union européenne” [The decision-making process in the European  
Union], Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne, 2002, 1, p. 35-52, p. 43, Dewost J-L., cité, p. 168 et Louis, Jean-Victor, 
“Les nouvelles procédures : conclusions et perspectives” [The new procedures: conclusions and prospects], 
in Engel, Christian et Wessels, Wolfgang, From Luxembourg to Maastricht. Institutional change in the European 
Community after the Single European Act, Bonn, Europa Union Verlag, 1992, p. 161. This data match and both  
the average proportion of decisions taken despite negative votes and abstentions (which count as negative votes) 
seem, since 1985, to be close to that established after the results published since 1993.
18.  80 according to Jean-Louis Dewost, 90 according to Paolo Ponzano. According to Jean-Louis Dewost, a legal advisor at 
the Council’s Secretariat, this is how the use of the vote has evolved: “We are moving […] towards a situation in which 
majority voting becomes the normal management arrangement for the Community whilst the need to have consensus 
remains for some essential political choices […] Two interesting phenomena deserve to be highlighted in the analysis 
of the use of the vote in recent years: not only has the number of votes in the Council increased considerably but also 
their ‘meaning’ tends to change. […] In term of scale, we note that we have moved from some isolated votes per year 
to a dozen or so votes in 1980 then to twenty or so in 1982, to forty or so in 1984 and again in 1985, to end up close 
to 80 votes in 1986. This is a completely remarkable trend that has escaped a large number of observers. It concerns 
all the Council’s sectors of activity but more particularly agriculture, fisheries as well as trade policy, not to mention 
budgetary and statutory issues that have experienced a very old and uninterrupted use of the vote.” Dewost J.-L., cited 
p. 168. However, according to Paolo Ponzano, the number of votes before 1985 was lower than Jean-Louis Dewost says.
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According to one participant in the 1980s negotiations, who came back to the 
Council in the social affairs sector in the mid 1990s, once the directives setting 
up the Single Market were adopted, delegations took fewer risks. People began to 
talk about ‘looking for consensus’, which, according to him and several members 
of the secretariat interviewed, ‘doesn’t mean anything’. It is possible that, in the 
1990s, one presidency after another hesitated before using the vote as a deterrent 
because the Single Market had been completed. However, it is important to put this 
change in context. On the one hand, texts adopted in the social affairs sector only 
account for a small minority of decisions taken by the Council. On the other hand, 
the testimony of this person could lead one to establishing a dichotomy between 
looking for consensus and using the vote as a deterrent. But, as one official put 
it, these are two sides of the same phenomenon. It is the possibility of a vote that 
leads participants to reach agreement.
While qualified majority voting may have had less influence after 1992, the inter-
views done with officials in the Council who were all in the Council at least since the 
beginning of the 2000s revealed an unexpected phenomenon. Generally speaking, 
the presidency does not look to associate all the participants with the final com-
promise. In truth, on the one hand, overly watered down compromises would be 
a result of this and, on the other, decision-making would be slowed down too 
much whereas every presidency is motivated by a wish to be productive. Generally 
speaking, the presidency proposes the adoption of its compromises once it thinks 
that there is no longer a blocking minority. The exceptions to this rule are the cases 
when a big member state refuses to be put in a minority and those where a vital 
interest of a member state is threatened by a text that has sufficient support to be 
adopted. We tried to obtain a general view of the role of qualified majority voting 
by interviewing about twenty members of Coreper 1 (which deals with most of 
the sectors coming under qualified majority voting). When we asked members of 
Coreper 1 if they saw differences between sectors, they tended to reply that the 
search for productivity was a feature for all the sectors that they knew about.
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III. The norm for getting minorities to join the majority
According to people involved in decision-making before 1993, the ‘figures [in 
terms of votes] have no meaning’ because the general rule was that the presidency 
noted a qualified majority without a vote and those in the minority chose to remain 
silent. ‘The minutes don’t mean anything’ because those who were not satisfied 
did not want to appear like the ‘black sheep’. This phenomenon of joining the 
majority prior to 1993 is thus noted by the presidency of the Council in 1990: “The 
difficulty in providing statistics (on votes in the Council) is related to the way in 
which votes are taken in the Council. On many occasions, when a Member State 
sees that a vote will not be to its advantage, it joins the consensus rather than 
ask for a vote which would not alter the situation. Consequently, even if records 
were available, I am convinced that they would not be especially reliable.”19
However, getting those in a minority to join the majority has not been made more 
difficult by making votes public. Meetings with decision-making interviewees in 
recent years, whether they belong to the secretariat or the permanent representa-
tion of a member state, show that joining the majority continues to be the norm. 
19.  Answer of President-in-office of the Council to question No. 89 (H-609/90) of Mr. De Vries, European Parliament, 
verbatim report of 13 June 1990, cited by Bieber, R., “Majority Voting and the Cooperation Procedure”, in C. Engel 
et W. Wessels, From Luxembourg to Maastricht. Institutional change in the EC after the SEA, Europa Union Verlag, 
Bonn, 1992, p. 57.
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In a reply to a member of the European Parliament in 2001, the Council secretar-
iat noted this phenomenon in its way: “Qualified majority voting can in practice 
promote the agreement of all the delegations on a text to the extent that delega-
tions who do not agree with it can be inclined to vote in favour of it once they know 
that they are going to be outvoted.”20
National representatives refer more precisely to different motivations:
• In the Council, voting against an adopted text or abstaining is looked on 
badly by the Commission and the presidency. The Commission and the pres-
idency try to listen and to take into account the demands of the different 
ministries: not joining in with the majority is considered as a lack of respect 
for their work. Because they will have to negotiate again with the same 
partners, representatives find it more prudent to join the majority when they 
have not secured what they wanted. This shadow cast by the future is all 
the more influential because the presidency is a rotating one. The ministers 
who could show that they are not satisfied by voting against a measure 
adopted or by abstaining avoid drawing attention to themselves so that the 
presidency of their country will not be blocked by this kind of behaviour.
• Representatives of member states fear that public votes against proposals 
and abstentions might have harmful consequences at the national level. 
They need to face journalists during the press conferences following 
Councils and tend to withdraw from the obligation to justify a negative vote 
or an abstention which run the risk of being perceived as failures in the 
negotiations. Moreover, they fear that a vote against a measure adopted or 
an abstention might be used by their political opponents, making the imple-
mentation of the measure which they opposed difficult. While ministers 
sometimes look to give publicity to their opposition (for example, German 
representatives can therefore show the Länder [German regions] that were 
opposed that they fought against a measure but that it was adopted and that 
it is going to be necessary to implement it or when Great Britain was headed 
up by a Conservative government, the then prime minister John Major had 
no hesitation in voting publicly against adopted texts, behaviour that the 
Blair government distanced itself from), in general they look to keep quiet 
the fact that their demands have not been satisfied during negotiations.
20.  Written question E-3938/00 asked by Christopher Huhne (ELDR) to the Council. Number of qualified majority votes, 
Official Journal n° C 364 E of 20/12/2001 p. 0004-0005.
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According to national representatives, voting against a proposal or abstaining 
leads to that country drawing attention to itself, which is desirable neither in the 
Council nor at the national level. When ministers do not respect the call to join 
the majority, their peers regard their behaviour as being incomprehensible and 
excessive, incompatible with the diplomatic workings of the Council. The case of 
the Polish government, often described as obstructionist, was cited during almost 
all the interviews we held with those witnessing the decision-making process in 
recent years. We would note that an opponent or a country abstaining runs the 
risk of drawing attention to themselves all the more so as the qualified majority 
is high. When a text is adopted, the number of opponents or countries abstain-
ing can only be low such that they are like a ‘fly on milk’ [an equivalent expression 
in English is to ‘stick out like a sore thumb’], to quote the expression used by a 
Spanish representative.
Moreover, when the Council examines a text in codecision with the European 
Parliament, the rule is that representatives of member states defend the Council’s 
common position en bloc against MEPs. Although this rule is informal, it is 
respected by the delegations. It can be explained by the fact that groups of MEPs 
could use divisions in the Council to have the text changed to what they want. The 
extension of codecision to new areas has contributed to decisions being persis-
tently taken apparently unopposed and the proportion of votes is lower when the 
decisions need to be taken by codecision.
The Council’s famous culture of consensus thus consists of not opposing a text 
which is going to be adopted even if one disagrees with it. That is a diplomats’ 
culture, which means that the presidency of the Council and the Commission 
satisfy every member state before having a text adopted. In the sphere of qualified 
majority voting, national representatives are very active and come together by 
themselves. However, while the fact that countries in the minority join the majority 
partly explains why, in the 1980s and today, a large proportion of decisions are 
taken unopposed, how is it possible to make them join the majority? Has the 
growing openness of the Council changed this practice?
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IV.  The presidency’s trump cards and the lack of 
transparency of member states’ positions
When we spoke to interviewees, two contrasting visions emerged. In the Council, 
everyone knows everything and in the Council, nobody knows the exact state of 
positions. However, interviews with all the past and present officials lead us to 
state that the presidency is better informed than national negotiators. The pres-
idency leads the debates and looks for compromises on the Commission’s 
proposals together with the Commission. The negotiations make headway thanks 
to bilateral contacts which allow the presidency, assisted by the Council secretar-
iat, to be better informed about the delegations’ positions. This privileged level of 
information is noted by both those witnessing decision-making before 1993 and 
present day witnesses.
A second fundamental particularity remains. The aim of any presidency is to have 
the highest number possible of proposals adopted. The presidency looks as far 
as possible to achieve a qualified majority on the different files that it inherits 
for its six-month period. This six-monthly rhythm stimulates rivalry between pres-
idencies.21 The interviews revealed that the presidency has put its more precise 
21.  It is possible that the new presidency system put in place by the Treaty of Lisbon might lead to reducing the impact 
of this factor but this effect cannot be evaluated as part of this study.
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knowledge of the positions of delegations at the service of this search for efficien-
cy both yesterday and today. How does it use its privileged level of information?
Those witnessing negotiations before 1993 explained that very often decisions 
were taken unopposed because the presidency ‘noted’ that a text could be 
adopted without asking delegations to vote by raising their hands or by express-
ing their position during a ‘tour de table’. This assertion was made on the basis 
of information gathered in plenary and thanks to bilateral contacts with different 
delegations. This second source of information was the most reliable because, 
in meetings, delegations remained vague to keep some margin for manoeuvre in 
negotiations and so as not to appear defeated vis-à-vis their peers if they did not 
obtain what they wanted. In reality, being clear about one’s position, whether in 
a positive or negative way, prevented countries from obtaining more concessions. 
A member state stating that it was against a proposal was no longer listened to 
by the presidency, which was looking to win the support of delegations that were 
apparently more flexible. A member state stating from the outset that it was in 
favour of a proposal ran the same risk once its vote was won. So remaining vague 
was the better strategy. That is why the presidency sought to determine what the 
real demands were in bilateral meetings. When it considered that there was no 
longer a blocking minority, it proposed the adoption of the text. The presidency 
only made an exception to this rule if a big country refused to be put in the minority 
or if the national interest of a country was considerably threatened by the text that 
was in the middle of being adopted.
This method led to decisions being taken when the positions of delegations were 
not necessarily clear. National representatives were not very sure of the state of 
positions because bilateral contacts and granting concessions led to general insta-
bility. They relied on the presidency’s assertion that they thought better informed 
than their own. When the latter declared that a proposal had enough support to be 
adopted, they did not oppose it. It is because of these practices that our interview-
ees stated that it is not possible to determine how many legislative acts have been 
adopted before 1993 without the support of all member states.
The presidency used its information to push for the adoption of proposals by 
taking care, in particular, of how it gave the floor to countries. In plenary session, a 
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member of the secretariat would note down the names of delegations that wanted 
to speak. The presidency would consult the list and it would happen that it did 
not give the floor to the first country that had asked to speak but to the second, 
which the first country contested. The presidency would reply that it decided on 
the order of speakers. In fact, the order of speakers was meant to ‘bank’ declara-
tions of support for its compromise. It thus tried to dissuade those that would then 
speak from expressing their disagreement in the hope that it would more easily 
achieve a qualified majority.
What is more, if, during plenary sessions, the presidency judged that there was a 
blocking minority, it could decide to interrupt the meeting to speak with one or two 
delegations individually. It would again open the meeting after these exchanges 
by stating that “we have a qualified majority compromise”. However, nothing had 
changed in the compromise that had not been supported by a qualified majority 
before the interruption. The representatives could deduce from that that the pres-
idency had made some oral promises to one or other of the delegations after it/
they had gone back during the bilateral exchange on the position that it/they had 
backed in the meeting. In that way, the presidency could have a text adopted that 
was on the way to being rejected. Nobody contested its method because a delega-
tion that would have asked for a vote would have found itself in an embarrassing 
situation if the vote had ended up with a qualified majority. The prospect of nego-
tiating again with the same people acted as a deterrent for opposing the presi-
dency’s assertion, which was deemed as better informed than all the delegations.
In addition to its superior information, the presidency could use its procedur-
al privilege to favour the adoption of texts which member states were opposed 
to. Rather than asking “who is opposed to this compromise?”, which might have 
encouraged opponents to declare their hand and might have unleashed a chain 
reaction, it could get around the difficulty by saying to Coreper or to SCA: “I intend 
to present this text as an ‘A point’ at the Council” (an A point is a text that the 
ministers will formally adopt in Council because only they have a right to vote, but 
without discussion, as an agreement has been reached at Coreper or SCA level). 
Countries in the minority would conclude from that that the qualified majority had 
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been reached and would keep quiet.22 The presidency would thereby discourage 
a possible blocking minority from expressing itself, or, if there were not enough 
opponents to block the decision, it meant that the fact that they were in a minority 
was not revealed.
However, it is important not to believe that all the delegations fell for these 
manoeuvres. The fact of there not being a vote could be useful to them. This was 
the case, for example, when, rather than having a vote, the presidency declared: 
“I note that the conditions are there for a decision to be taken because there is 
an agreement.” This ambiguous wording could mean that there was a qualified 
majority or that there was a general agreement in favour of the text proposed for 
adoption. Delegations could play on this ambiguity when they were not against a 
proposal but did not want people in their country to know that they had supported 
the proposal. They could say: we were against it but there was a qualified majority 
so we had to adopt the text. In addition, when trade agreements with non-EU 
countries were adopted, the fact that there had been a qualified majority without a 
vote allowed delegations who did not want the non-EU countries to know that they 
had been opposed not to be identified.
Have the publication of votes and the general policy of transparency on the activi-
ties of the Council put an end to these practices? A former permanent represen-
tative explained that, in the early 1990s, ministers and representatives feared 
that the obligation to vote publicly might lessen the efficiency of taking a decision 
by hardening the positions of delegations. It would no longer be possible to use 
the adage that perhaps best reflects the workings of the Council: “He/she who 
says nothing agrees.” These fears turned out to be without foundation because 
decisions are mostly taken by Coreper or SCA. The partial opening of sessions only 
concerns meetings of ministers in Council. Coreper and SCA meetings are held 
entirely behind closed doors. In these circumstances, members of Coreper and 
SCA have kept the usual practices from before 1993. The presidency continues 
not to make delegations vote to prevent their position from hardening and so that 
22.  The delegations could also ask the presidency to put the text down as a ‘false point B’. Point Bs are texts that will be 
discussed by ministers because they include problems that Coreper or SCA has not resolved. Either these texts were 
then sent back to representatives in Coreper or SCA to be reworked or they were adopted directly by the ministers. 
When a text is a ‘false point B’, representatives have found an agreement but, during its adoption, a minister wants 
to make a statement opposing or supporting it.
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measures are adopted more easily. The texts can still be adopted in silence, by 
soft consensus, without the positions of all the delegations being clear. Noting 
a qualified majority without having a vote is therefore a ‘quite practical practice’ 
to use the words of a permanent representative. The presidency can move texts 
from one working group to Coreper or SCA or from Coreper or SCA to the Council 
even if a qualified majority is not solidly established. As from the moment when 
the presidency of Coreper or SCA notes that a text can be adopted as a ‘point A’ 
by the Council without having a vote, the uncertainty on the state of positions is 
mixed with the reasons set out above, which therefore encourages the countries in 
a minority to join the majority.
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V.  The shadow cast by the future and conforming:  
two permanent features
The combination of two permanent features particular to the Council explains how 
the methods used by the presidency are effective.
First of all, the shadow cast by the future plays a big role. Members of the Council 
try not to harm each other to avoid retaliation.
In addition, there is a strong tendency towards countries wanting to conform and 
this works in favour of proposals being adopted. Diplomats are wary not to stand 
out in a circle that they frequent almost every day. They need to have major difficul-
ties to take the floor because they always run the risk of being seen as obstruction-
ist or as an individual that is delaying the meetings without good reason. According 
to interviews with current officials, we may have the impression that the impact 
of wanting to conform has only grown with the enlargements to include small 
countries. The presidency and the Commission seek the support of big countries as 
a priority because they thereby achieve a qualified majority more quickly. If a small 
country opposes a proposal without a very good reason, it runs the risk of not being 
heard by the presidency, which will be looking for the support of countries that 
have the most votes. To be heard, it is therefore very much in the interests of the 
28 - Qualified majority voting  from the Single european act to the preSent day: an unexpected permanence
representatives of small countries to limit the number of times they take the floor. 
In addition, sometimes the material means are missing at the national level for the 
representatives of small countries to receive instructions, which seems to lead them 
pretty mechanically to rely on the Commission’s expertise, or, less often, on that 
of representatives of big countries. Finally, they have a smaller range of interests 
than do the bigger countries. As they have no interest at stake in certain proposals 
and have therefore every incentive to go in the direction of the Commission, their 
default position is to support its proposals. It is important to point out here that the 
Commission’s proposals are reputed to represent on average more the interests 
of small countries than those of the big countries. According to current decision-
taking officials, this trend for small countries to conform is a ‘deadweight’ in nego-
tiations that makes the formation of blocking minorities by big countries more 
difficult.
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VI. The policy of transparency and its effects
In theory one might think that publishing votes23 forces delegations to give an 
account of positions that they have defended behind closed doors. But things are 
more complicated because only the results of votes are made public. The adoption 
of texts by a vote is not itself public and it would be difficult for it to be so as 
the presidency does not open the voting procedure up in plenary session. The 
decision-taking organisation allows countries in the minority to join the majority 
between the informal adoption of texts behind closed doors and the publication of 
votes. In this context, only the delegations of member states in which national MPs 
control the vote of their ministers in the Council are obliged to note their position 
behind closed doors via their public vote. This is in particular the case in Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Sweden.24 While the publication of votes is certainly progress, 
the lack of systematic control by national parliaments and the organisation of 
decision-making in the Council do not make it possible to fully benefit from the 
transparency rules in the Council. When we were doing research for this report, it 
23.  The results of votes are published on this site:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents/legislative-transparency/public-votes.aspx?lang=en
24.  Cf. UE : la réforme du Conseil des ministres [EU: the reform of the Council of Ministers], Seminar organised in Paris 
on 4 September 2000 by Notre Europe and the association Friends of Europe, under the chairmanship of Jacques 
Delors and Étienne Davignon, Report by Jean-Louis Arnaud, February 2001, p. 5.
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was still too early to assess to what extent the growing influence of the national 
parliaments – stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon – has changed the practices of 
vote.
The organisation of decision-making in the Council is such that the registering of 
the votes by the permanent representatives is a phase that is so to speak indepen-
dent of negotiations. As we have pointed out, most decisions are in fact informal-
ly taken by Coreper (or by the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) if measures 
pertain to the latter field), which works behind closed doors. During Coreper or SCA 
plenary sessions, delegations do not say that they will vote against a text or will 
abstain. Things happen in a much more subtle way. It is during bilateral meetings 
with the presidency that delegations communicate their intention to vote against 
a text or to abstain. In general, once the presidency has declared in Coreper or 
in SCA that there is a qualified majority in favour of a text, it proposes that the 
Council adopts it in a future meeting. It then sends an electronic message to the 
permanent representations asking those who want to vote against or abstain to 
write to it before a certain date. Those who do not reply are considered as having 
approved the text. During the official adoption in the Council, the presidency reads 
out the list of countries voting against or abstaining and a table shows the results 
of the ‘vote’. But ministers do not vote in the meeting. The votes are pre-entered 
into electronic machines. This organisation encourages countries in the minority to 
‘drop things’ as the text is to be adopted anyway and so they usually consider that 
they have no interest in voting against it or abstaining.
The policy of transparency also implies that part of the Council sessions are 
broadcast on the internet. Now, just as it did when the Council was only working 
behind closed doors, the presidency can still interrupt meetings when it considers 
that a conversation with a delegation will enable it to get around a blocking 
minority or the resistance of a minister to the adoption of a text. More generally, 
country officials find ways to get around the transparency, for example by negotiat-
ing during a lunch break.
Despite the obstacles which the policy of transparency comes up against, the pub-
lication of votes does constitute notable progress. Before the publication of votes, 
from 1985 to 1993, the presidency would use the technique of ‘silent qualified 
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majority’ to have texts adopted against which there was in fact a blocking minority. 
That was for example the case when it was necessary to take decisions on the 
status of European civil servants and their remuneration. It transpired that too 
many member states were opposed to the increase in remuneration for it to be 
adopted. The governments of these countries argued in particular that they could 
not give European civil servants who were already “paid too much” what they 
were not giving their own civil servants. However, because there were trade union 
movements in the Council staff who were driven on by a very strong minority that 
threatened to go on strike, the secretariat and the presidency encouraged repre-
sentatives of member states to vote for increases in remuneration. The represen-
tatives of governments against this did not want to go beyond their instructions 
but did not want the work of the Council to be interrupted by a strike by the staff 
either. That is why the presidency noted a qualified majority and asked representa-
tives who had instructions to vote against it to keep silent. The latter then told their 
capitals that they had been put into a minority but without mentioning the other 
opponents. The increase in remuneration could therefore be adopted despite the 
existence of a blocking minority. Given that votes are published today, it would 
be impossible for permanent representatives not to respect the instructions of 
their ministers and for the Council to adopt texts against which there is a blocking 
minority.
Apparently, by the expression ‘silent qualified majority’ used by those witnessing 
decisions taken before 1993, one should not understand only these cases of false 
majorities but also decisions taken by real qualified majority without the opponents 
being identified. As we have pointed out, when the minutes of Councils in 1988 
include the reference: “Council has adopted directive x by qualified majority”, this 
wording is not just a reference to the legal basis of the decision. It means that there 
were opponents of the decision that did not want to be recorded in the minutes.
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The publication of votes prevents these ambiguities. Either the opponents of a 
legislative act adopted and those abstaining are identified in the minutes or it is 
indicated that all the member states approved the adopted text.25 However, as we 
have pointed out, the opponents are today only obliged to note their opposition 
or their abstention when a strict national parliamentary control obliges ministers 
to show loyalty to their MPs. They must then publicly oppose it or abstain if the 
national parliament has expressed its disagreement with a directive or a regula-
tion. So it is necessary that the policy of transparency in the Council is accompa-
nied by a growing role of national parliaments in order to develop the advances in 
this area contained in the Treaty of Lisbon.
25.  However, this is recent notation (2008): for a number of years, in the column ‘results of votes’, only countries voting 
against a proposal or abstaining were mentioned. When no delegation had recorded a vote of opposition or an 
abstention, the ‘results of votes’ column was empty. In addition, on the Council’s minutes before 1993, negative 
votes and abstentions – except in a tiny number of cases – are only indicated for B points. For texts adopted as 
A points, no mention is made of opponents or those abstaining. This reference does not appear on the minutes 
of the Coreper meetings consulted either (those for 1988). However, officials of the time noted that when the 
presidency of Coreper or SCA noted that a file was going to be adopted as an A point in Council, that did not mean 
that there was no opponent and that a general agreement had been found but that the countries in a minority 
accepted not to oppose the adoption of the text. By contrast, today, when the presidency reads out a list of A points 
adopted by the Council, it mentions the negative votes and the abstentions.
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Conclusion
Thus, it does not seem that the use of qualified majority voting has evolved 
considerably in the Council. Qualified majority has been the driver of decision- 
making since the middle of the 1980s. Bitter negotiations on the weighting of votes 
during different enlargements are far from being unwarranted contrary to what has 
sometimes been argued. With the formation of blocking minorities being at the 
heart of decision-making, governments have a real and considerable interest in 
seeking to obtain as many votes as possible.
Although, since 1993, in around 80% of cases, the decisions that could have been 
taken by qualified majority were in fact taken without opposition, that does not 
mean that in practice the Council looks for a general agreement. It is qualified 
majority itself that encourages delegations fearing that they will be put in a 
minority to make compromises and join the majority. This decision-making rule is 
therefore much more effective than the unanimity rule. This study also shows that, 
while presidencies do not aim to satisfy all the member states but aim for a strict 
qualified majority, it is because they seek to have the largest possible number of 
legislative texts adopted. This search for efficiency has been noted by those that 
have taken part in the Council’s activities in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
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Examining minutes from the Council reveals that, at the end of the 1980s, the norm 
was, as today, to adopt legislative texts without negative votes or explicit absten-
tions. The considerable proportion of decisions taken without apparent opposition 
was already due to the fact that countries in a minority tend to join the majority 
once they know that they can no longer block the adoption of a text. The publica-
tion of votes as from 1993 has not put an end to this practice because ministers 
are not forced in most member states record their opposition behind closed doors 
by publishing a negative vote or an abstention. The publication of votes does of 
course constitute progress, but for it to allow better democratic control of positions 
taken by ministers, national parliaments would need to be more involved in the 
decision-making. From this point of view, the Treaty of Lisbon constitutes progress 
(see the ‘Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union’). It 
will be necessary to assess its effects on the practices of vote. At this stage, we can 
only say that the proportion of legislative acts adopted in spite of negative votes or 
abstentions seems to have increased in 2010 and 2011.
We would finally note that the Treaty of Lisbon should help for the development of 
transparency in the Council. It stipulates that the Council must deliberate and vote 
in public26 and extend codecision to the whole of the agriculture sector and the 
justice and home affairs sector – which implies that meetings of the correspond-
ing Councils should be made public. In order to strengthen the transparency of the 
Council, the question needs to be asked as to how one can lift the veil of secrecy 
on two stages of the decision-making process:
1.  The activity of the Committee of permanent representative, which 
continues to be in charge of the biggest part of the decision-making;
2.  The ‘trialogues’ and the conciliation committees which are not public 
either.
26.  Article 16-8 TEU..
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Visions of Europe
Qualified majority voting
from the Single Act to present day: 
an unexpected permanence
This study, the second in the series that Notre Europe has devoted to the 
"institutional triangle", probes the way in which the use of the qualified majority 
voting has developed in the Council of the European Union. The investigation begins 
with the Single European Act, which expanded the field of decision-making by 
qualified majority in an effort to facilitate the adoption of the directives concerning 
the Single Market. The data that we analyse point to remarkable continuity in this 
field. The number of measures adopted after a formal vote remains low, despite 
a considerable expansion of the areas in which such a vote is permitted. Yet the 
search for a qualified majority rather than for universal agreement is the driving 
force behind negotiations. This study explains this seeming paradox, on which the 
publication of votes that began in 1993 has had hardly any impact at all.
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